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Turvey: Supply Problems in an Amphibious Operation

T

he operations to clear the approaches to
Antwerp were among the most important
actions carried out by the Canadian forces in
the Second World War yet relatively little is

known about them. The decision to mount an
amphibious attack behind German defences in
the Breskens Pocket was a particularly brilliant
example of what is now called manoeuvre
warfare, but neither Lieutenant-Guy Simonds,
acting commander of First Canadian Army, nor

Major-General Dan Spry, General Officer
Commanding 3rd Canadian Infantry Division,
have been given much credit for the exploit.
One of the many aspects of Operation
"Switchback" deserving of study is the logistical
problems of the operation. This contemporary
report prepared from 3rd Division's CRASC
(Commander, Royal Army Service Corps)
describes one aspect of the work of the Royal
Canadian Army Service Corps. - Editor

Supply Problems in an
Amphibious Operation
extract from War Diary, HQ, RCASC 3 CDN DIV, October 1944
CRASC
3CdnInfDiv
Sir,
Hereunder please find my report on BMA
[Beach Maintenance Area] established from 9
CDN INF BDE Operation "SWITCHBACK" amphibious landing on the SCHELDT Pocket,
area BIERVLIET, HOLLAND, 9 October 1944.
As per your instructions, I proceeded to
WIPPELGEM, BELGIUM, along with three
ammunition, three petrol and two supply issuers
to list and to take note of loading of thirty-eight
Terrapins, which were loaded with the following
and in priority of landing - Ammunition, Water,
Sups (como packs), Rum, Blankets, Pot and
Flame Throwing Fluid, making a total of 152
tons. Terrapins were completely loaded by 1500
hours, 7 October 1944 and we then proceeded
to join 9 CDN INF BDE HQ where we were
briefed. Captain McLellan joined us. Our job was
to proceed across the SAVOJAARDS PLAAT, a
stretch of water approximately four kilometres
distance, land on GREEN BEACH (sq 1914),
recce a petrol, ammunition and supply dump
which was to be called a Beach Maintenance
Area, from which units could draw readily all
desirable commodities. D-Day was October 9th,
H-Hour was approximately 0130 hours from two

assaulting battalions. We were to go across in
the morning, but since the beachhead was so
small at that time we were unable to land until
2100 hours that evening, being transported by
two buffaloes (LVT), each carrying one jeep. A
point of interest here arises in that the beach
was being heavily shelled from several
directions, the guiding lights on the beach had
been destroyed and consequently we were not
landed in the correct spot. The rest of that night
we spent on the beach in slit trenches. Captain
McLellan's jeep was unfortunately destroyed by
a shell. We contacted 9 BDE HQ and the next
day made a recce along with BRASCO 9 BDE.
Instead of selecting three different dumps for
ammunition, supply and petrol, it was decided
to establish one dump to hold all commodities.
This proved a wise decision as all anticipated
locations were shelled within the next four or
five days, which no doubt would have been
unfortunate had we been there. That evening
(October 10th), the 38 Terrapins arrived, which
we unloaded in the dark, completing this around
midnight. Thirty-six loaders had been provided
by 9 BDE as part of the BMA staff.
Captain T.R. MacDonald had arrived that day
also, along with 11 jeeps and trailers. Their job
was to haul ammunition from the beach, when
transported over by Buffaloes, because the
Buffaloes, unlike the Terrapins, could not leave
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the beach on account of the harm done to their
tracks by the hard roads. They off-loaded onto
the beach and the jeep platoon with their trailers
h a u l e d to the BMA. These worked very
satisfactorily from time to time. They were also
to establish forward ammunition, petrol or
supply points should the tactical situation arise.
This never happened.
On 11 October, the DAQMG [Deputy Adjutant
and Quartermaster General] visited us and was
apparently quite satisfied. On the night of
October 11 and during the day of October 12,
8 CDN INF BDE came in to enlarge the dump.

NAC PA 131249
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8 BDE provided one officer, Captain Bourassa
and 30 men. Captain Bourassa was made Camp
Commander on the BMA. Also, we received two
more ammunition, supply and petrol issuers.
Units would come in by troops, squadrons,
companies and even platoons, to draw their
requirements. We supplied them. Replenishment
was controlled by Division from the other side.
A State was sent them twice daily and Terrapins
arrived once daily with requirements as stocks
got low. The Terrapins did an excellent job and
are ideal for maintaining such a dump. They
loaded from RCASC dumps on the other side.
We carried in the BMA at its maximum,

Buffaloes, loaded with troops and supplies, leave Neuzen for the Canadian bridgehead, 11 October 1944.
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approximately 240 tons of ammunition, 60 tons
of petrol, derv, FTF (H) C02 bottles and oil, and
100 tons of supplies, water, blankets, stretchers
and signal equipment.
It is interesting to note that one shell, landing
in our dump, perforated 12 jerry cans of petrol,
but did not catch fire.
We also h a n d l e d refugees a n d some
prisoners, and feeding of the same. The three
hundred prisoners did enough work to warrant
the bully beef, hard tack and water expended
on them.
We continued to supply 8 and 9 BDES along
with supporting troops all their requirements
until October 18 when all remaining petrol and
supplies were withdrawn to company lines and
the ammunition remained there as a forward
ammunition point under the command of
Captain E. Manning.
Lessons to be learned from this operation
are as follows:
1. Adequate facilities should be provided
for refugees in the early stages. In our
case we took this on because of necessity.
We handled 150 people, young and old,
overnight as shipping space was not
available.
2. A Prisoner of War cage, together with
proper staff, should be set up in early
stages.
3. An Ordnance Officer with small staff
should be located in the BMA, to handle
mainly signal equipment.
4. Wireless communications should be
available between BMA and those
controlling the replenishment of the BMA
for urgent needs....
Field
25 October 1944
Top: Canadian wounded being unloaded from a Terrapin
amphibious vehicle at a Scheldt Pocket embarkation point west
of Terneuzen, Netherlands, 13 October 1944.
Middle: German prisoners, captured during the Operation
Switchback, disembark a Buffalo, 13 October 1944.

signed
A. J.S. Turvey, Captain
HQ RCASC 3 CDN INF DIV

Above: A Buffalo making the transition from land to water.
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